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Abstract
‘Post-truth’ is a failed concept, both epistemically and politically because 
its simplification of the relationship between truth and politics cripples our 
understanding and encourages authoritarianism. This makes the diagnosis 
of our ‘post-truth era’ as dangerous to democratic politics as relativism with 
its premature disregard for truth. In order to take the step beyond relativ-
ism and ‘post-truth’, we must conceptualise the relationship between truth 
and politics differently by starting from a ‘non-sovereign’ understanding of 
truth.
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Has politics, has society, well, have ‘we’ lost the respect for, or even worse, 
the interest in truth? This is the animating idea behind the newest diagnosis of 
our times, according to which we now live in a ‘post-truth era’. Steve Tesich, a 
screenwriter and playwright, coined the phrase ‘post-truth’ in 1992 to accuse 
the North American public of silently accepting the lies by the administration 
of President George Bush (Senior). Tesich’s drastic diagnosis is:
We are rapidly becoming prototypes of a people that totali-
tarian monsters could only drool about in their dreams. All 
the dictators up to now have had to work hard at suppres-
sing the truth. We, by our actions, are saying that this is no 
longer necessary, that we have acquired a spiritual mecha-
nism that can denude truth of any significance. In a very 
fundamental way we, as a free people, have freely decided 
that we want to live in some post-truth world. (Tesich 1992, 
13)
The diagnosis didn’t catch on in 1992, and it didn’t in 2004, when Ralph 
Keyes published the first book to use “post-truth era” (Keyes 2004) as a 
title. Today, it has. The Oxford Dictionaries as well as the Association for the 
German Language (Gesellschaft für deutsche Sprache) elected ‘post-truth’ 
as the Word of the Year 2016,[1] and its popularity is still growing, not only 
in the media but in scientific publications as well.[2]
I argue that the diagnosis of a ‘post-truth era’ is interesting—not in itself 
but as a symptom and because of its consequences. For ‘post-truth’ is a 
dangerous concept, both epistemically and politically: its simplification of 
the relationship between truth and politics cripples our understanding of it 
and encourages authoritarianism. This makes the diagnosis of ‘post-truth’ as 
dangerous to democratic politics as relativism with its premature disregard 
for truth. In order to take the step beyond relativism and ‘post-truth’, we 
must conceptualise the relationship between truth and politics differently 
by starting from a ‘non-sovereign’ understanding of truth.
To arrive at this conclusion, I first examine the diagnosis of us living in a 
‘post-truth era’ (I). Its attraction lies partly in ‘solving’ the conflict between 
two basic insights about the relationship between truth and politics by simply 
giving up one of them (II). I argue that letting go of either one leads to either 
relativism or authoritarianism. An adequate conceptualization of the relationship 
between truth and politics requires a non-sovereign understanding of truth 
that allows taking a more complex stance towards truth and politics (III).
I. After Truth?
‘Post-truth’ is not a precisely defined concept. We best understand it 
by looking at three examples often cited as evidence for the diagnosis of a 
‘post-truth era’. The first, notorious, example is Donald Trump’s claim that 
1.5 million people attended his inauguration, filling the space “all the way 
back to the Washington Monument”.[3] Confronted with aerial photographs 
clearly demonstrating the contrary, Sean Spicer, the White House Press 
Secretary, defended the president’s statement and proclaimed: “This was 
[1] See Oxford Dictionaries 2016 and 
Gesellschaft für deutsche Sprache 2016.
[2] See, for example, Peters et al. 2018 
or Fuller 2018.
[3] Remarks by President Trump and 
Vice President Pence at CIA Headquar-
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the largest audience to ever witness an inauguration—period—both in person 
and around the globe.” (Spicer, quoted in Fandos 2017) And the president’s 
advisor Kellyanne Conway boldly stated that the White House had registered 
legitimate “alternative facts” and would continue to oppose those to the facts 
reported by CNN or the New York Times (Fandos 2017). This episode surely 
is an instance of politics being uninterested in truth, but is it indicative of 
politics in a ‘post-truth era’? When exactly did the ‘era of truth’ end and the 
‘post-truth era’ begin? With the fable of mobile weapons of mass destruction, 
forged by the administration of George W. Bush (Junior) to justify the second 
war in Iraq? Or, if we stick to US-history, with the fact that the “the Johnson 
Administration had systematically lied, not only to the public but also to 
Congress” (Apple Jr. 1996), as shown by the Pentagon Papers? 
The second example is from Great Britain. The Vote Leave campaign 
promised voters during the Brexit election that leaving the European Union 
would free 350 million GBP per week which would be used to finance the 
National Health Service. Yet as early as 8am on the day after the vote, Nigel 
Farage backpedalled on the promise: “No I can’t [guarantee it], and I would 
never have made that claim. That was one of the mistakes that I think the 
leave campaign made […].” (Farage, quoted in Travis 2016) Given that he was 
part of the campaign, we seem to have a further case of post-truth politics. 
Or is it merely another broken promise made during an election campaign? 
My third example is less well-known but noteworthy because it concerns the 
institution that society commissions to produce truths: the university. High-
quality newspapers and other media outlets frequently report that universities 
have become dominated by leftist activists who shame, boycott and bully 
those who dare to voice different opinions (in the case of German universities 
see e.g. Forth 2016; Novotny et al. 2016). The two biggest ‘success stories’, 
invented and circulated by conservative and right-winged think tanks, are 
the concerns over a pernicious ‘political correctness’ (Feldstein 1997; Weigel 
2016) and the self-proclaimed ‘anti-genderism’ (Hark/Villa 2015; Redecker 
2016). Charging others with ‘political correctness’ allows those making this 
allegation to keep on discriminating against women, people of colour or other 
minorities.[4] Similarly, the current wave of ‘anti-genderism’ mobilises anti-
academic sentiments and rhetoric to portray the Gender Studies as mighty 
corruptors of the university and society at large. Since neither a left hegemony 
nor domination by the chronically underfunded Gender Studies has ever been 
shown to exist,[5] does the insistence on such claims amount to a turn away 
from a concern with truth even in high-quality media outlets? Or are we just 
witnessing a clash of political opinions about what kind of university, what 
kind of science and ultimately what kind of society we want?
These three examples, then, are not simply evidence for the diagnosis of 
a ‘post-truth era’ but give us three reasons to be sceptical as well. First, we 
should doubt the historical claim inherent in the diagnosis of a ‘post-truth 
era’, for we will not find an ‘era of truth’ that came before. This is not a trifle 
problem of a narrow-minded empiricist, for any diagnosis of our times must 
spell out what is new today, must locate a break somewhere in history to 
divide ‘our times’ from the times before, and must state the criteria that allow 
[4] Cf. Chait 2015: “Political correctness is 
a style of politics in which the more radical 
members of the left attempt to regulate 
political discourse by defining opposing 
views as bigoted and illegitimate.”
[5] Studies on student’s political attitudes 
in Germany show that the political interest 
of students and the potential for the politi-
cal left at the universities have consistently 
declined in the last 25 years: see Multrus 
et al. 2017, 79–81, 86–89; Bargel 2017, 26 
f., 30. Counting all professors at German 
universities even marginal related to Gen-
der Studies shows that they make up 0.4 
to 0.5 percent of all German professors, 
virtually unchanged since 2000 (see Hark/
Villa 2015, 22).
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dating the divide (see Vogelmann forthcoming).[6] It would be rather self-
defeating if those diagnosing and criticizing our ‘post-truth era’ eschewed 
concerns about the truths of their claims.
Second, we should doubt the diagnosis of the ‘post-truth era’ because we 
lack conceptual criteria for distinguishing between e.g. propaganda, ideology, 
lies and the disrespect for truth that the concept ‘post-truth’ is meant to single 
out (D’Ancona 2017, 26). The most common attempt identifies as new the 
cynicism displayed by those producing ‘post-truth’. For example, Vincent F. 
Hendricks and Mads Vestergaard (2017, 5) suggest that ‘post-truth’ is distinct 
from propaganda and simple lies because lies or propaganda statements 
are meant to be believed and therefore cannot be openly acknowledged as 
propaganda or lies. This, however, seems to be a rather naïve idea of both 
‘post-truth’ and propaganda or political lies. On the one hand, ‘post-truth’ 
statements are certainly meant to be believed, for they aim at orienting 
people’s behaviour. Even obvious cases like the silly inauguration claim are 
defended (see the various—and hilarious—attempts by Sean Spicer reported 
in Fandos 2017), and more complex cases are only obvious lies if access to 
truth is presumed to be a simple matter, against which Raymond Geuss (2014, 
140f.) rightfully protests. On the other hand, propaganda and political lies 
are frequently used openly in politics because it demonstrates power over 
others to make them affirm a statement they all know to be false (Müller 
2017, 127). Hence cynicism cannot successfully serve as a criterion for what 
is new in the ‘post-truth era’.
The third reason why we should doubt the diagnosis of a ‘post-truth era’ is 
epistemological. Getting to know the truth is always hard work since the truth 
“doesn’t lie there on the street in the sun waiting to be observed by anyone 
who glances in its general direction” (Geuss 2014, 140). And knowing the 
truth is presumed by diagnosing that others—‘post-truthers’—no longer care 
for it. Still, those diagnosing a ‘post-truth era’ often replace the hard work of 
justifying their truth-claims with appeals that we must learn to trust again 
(D’Ancona 2017, 36): our political elites, our fellow citizens and, most of 
all, our scientists. Yet which experts, which scientists, which politicians and 
who of our fellow citizens should we trust? Without explaining how we can 
discriminate between blind faith and trust, calls for a renewal of the virtue 
of trust turn into calls for being less critical—certainly a bad strategy if we 
really lived in a ‘post-truth era’ with its reign of ‘fake news’ and phony experts. 
Epistemological questions are, ironically, the first victim of the diagnosis of 
a ‘post-truth era’.
Harbouring these historical, conceptual and epistemological doubts 
comes naturally but is distracting. We should not presume that the problem 
addressed by the diagnosis of a ‘post-truth era’ is conceptualised well enough 
by that diagnosis to make it our starting point for further investigation. Louis 
Althusser’s (1971, 162–165) warning that our social practices are not found 
in ideology, neither distorted nor undistorted, is pertinent in this respect. 
His conclusion is to analyse the practices producing the ideology instead of 
the ideology itself. Similarly, we should formulate the problem addressed by 
[6] Matthew D’Ancona (2017, 113) empha-
sises that his critique of post-truth is “ab-
solutely not a restorationalist or heritage 
project, a mission to turn back the clock to 
an imagined past of untarnished veracity. 
There was never such a time and, even if 
there had been, it would be impossible to 
recreate”. Yet if what is new in the ‘post-
truth era’ is the public’s non-reaction to 
the “mendacity of politicians” (ibid.), then 
there was a ‘pre-post-truth era’, in which 
the public actually cared about truth. This 
concern for truth is what D’Ancona wants 
to restore.
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the diagnosis of a ‘post-truth era’ in independent terms. Yet which problem 
is that?
II. Truth in Politics: Too Weak or Too Strong?
That problem is neither the medialization of politics with the acceleration 
of information and gossip and the collapse of editorial gate-keepers nor the 
sudden rise of feelings against a rational politics nor the cunning of demagogues 
spinning ‘narratives’. The problem is the troubled relationship between truth 
and politics—which lies beneath all of these formulations. 
The diagnosis of a ‘post-truth era’ presupposes without argument that we 
already know the ideal form that relationship should take: politics must respect 
the authority of truth and must yield to truth if it finds itself in opposition 
to truth. I will return to this diagnosis, but in order to pose the problem that 
gives rise to the diagnosis of a ‘post-truth era’ in independent terms, we must 
take a detour through political philosophy which has analysed the relationship 
between truth and politics as the conflict between two ‘forces’. Its two basic 
insights, trivial at first glance but immensely influential, are the sobering 
realization that truth rarely helps us settle our most important disagreements, 
and the stern warning of truth being hostile to politics because of its anti-
political (‘objective’) character. For simplicity’s sake, I will use John Rawls’ 
(II.1) and Hannah Arendt’s (II.2) formulations of these two insights, for they 
capture their underlying conviction particularly well. This does not imply that 
both share a common concept of truth or of politics—they certainly do not. 
Yet despite all their differences, both conceptualise the relationship between 
politics and truth as a conflict between two forces and thereby demonstrate 
just how common this conceptualisation of the relationship between truth 
and politics is and how basic the two convictions are.
II.1 The Rawls Conviction: Irresistible Reasonable Pluralism 
The first conviction about the relationship between truth and politics stems 
from a lesson learned in bloody wars (especially in 17th century in Europe): 
toleration, most importantly the toleration of different religions. For tolerating 
religions means accepting that people fundamentally disagree about their 
most cherished truths. Although we commit ourselves to certain truths, we 
accept that other people are equally committed to other truths. And although 
we believe them to be wrong, we know of convincing counter-reasons to 
our own objections. This balance convinces us that we will have to tolerate 
disagreement and therefore will have to relativize our convictions—without 
necessarily becoming sceptics or relativists (Forst 2013, 22f., 480–496).
It is only a small step from the idea of toleration to the influential concept 
of reasonable pluralism as formulated by John Rawls. When constructing a 
conception of justice adequate for modern societies, he argues, we face the fact 
that the diversity of reasonable comprehensive religious, 
philosophical, and moral doctrines found in modern demo-
cratic societies is not a mere historical condition that may 
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soon pass away; it is a permanent feature of the public cul-
ture of democracy. Under the political and social conditions 
secured by the basic rights and liberties of free institutions, 
a diversity of conflicting and irreconcilable—and what’s 
more, reasonable—comprehensive doctrines will come 
about and persist if such diversity does not already obtain. 
(Rawls 2005, 36)
Regarding the relationship between truth and politics, there are three important 
aspects to Rawls’ statement: First, the pluralism of doctrines is neither a passing 
historical condition nor a problem to be solved but a permanent condition of 
modernity. It is not a problem that must be solved, Rawls argues, because a 
just society with democratic institutions encourages the free use of reason, 
and reasonable pluralism is the necessary result (Rawls 2005, 37). Attempts 
to resolve this pluralism would have to use illegitimate coercive means. Rawls 
calls the “fact of oppression” that “a continuing shared understanding on one 
comprehensive religious, philosophical, or moral doctrine can be maintained 
only by the oppressive use of state power” (ibid.). In a free and just society, 
the pluralism of doctrines is destined to persist and likely to grow.
Second, reasonable pluralism is distinct from mere pluralism. The idea 
is not just that we find in our societies an overwhelming wealth of different 
moral, political, ethical or aesthetic doctrines, by which Rawls means sets 
of interconnected judgements that define the basic values and their role in 
life. We do find a plurality of such doctrines, but for Rawls only reasonable 
doctrines are of interest. They are characterised by a moral ideal of reciprocity, 
because proponents of such doctrines accept to abide by the fair terms of 
cooperation which they put forward themselves, and they accept the burden to 
give public reasons for their views that cannot presuppose a shared, reasonable 
comprehensive doctrine (54).[7] Reasonable pluralism is a pluralism of 
reasonable doctrines and implies that neither of these can be shown to be 
‘irrational’, ‘immoral’ or simply ‘wrong’. Truth will not resolve reasonable 
disagreements:[8] Reason is not unanimous and does not speak in one voice 
(pace Habermas 1992).
Third, Rawls gives a reason for the possibility of reasonable disagreement 
that significantly weakens the consequences of his “fact of reasonable pluralism”. 
For he argues that reasonable disagreements stem from (at least six) obstacles 
to our exercise of reason (see Rawls 2005, 56f.):
(a) We encounter conflicting and complex evidence.
(b) Even if we agree on certain reasons, we assign different importance 
to them.
(c) All concepts are subject to interpretation because of their internal 
indeterminacy.
(d) How we reason is affected by our whole biography.
(e) Issues are difficult to judge because there are many reasons of different 
normative strength.
(f) Not all values can be realised at the same time, so decisions about 
priorities are necessary.
These “burdens of judgement” (54) are controversial, because—so is Rawls’ 
[7] Rawls is rather vague when it comes to 
“the reasonable”. Furthermore, he charac-
terises it as a trait of persons but repeatedly 
uses concepts like “reasonable doctrines”, 
“reasonable pluralism” etc. See Wenar 
1995, 38–57 and Habermas 2011, 37–40.
[8] “Let’s say that reasonable disagree-
ment is disagreement between reasonable 
persons: that is, between persons who have 
realized their two moral powers to a degree 
sufficient to be free and equal citizens in 
a constitutional regime, and who have 
an enduring desire to honor fair terms of 
cooperation and to be fully cooperating 
members of society.” (Rawls 2005, 55)
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argument—accepting them is a condition for being reasonable.[9] Furthermore, 
by locating the sources of reasonable disagreement in the circumstances of 
reasoning (and mostly in our finite and bodily nature: see Forst 2013, 487–491), 
Rawls implicitly presupposes an ‘ideal reason’ without these external shackles 
and therefore without reasonable disagreement. He thereby misunderstands 
his own insight into the fact of reasonable pluralism, because if we can 
presuppose such an ‘ideal reason’, the fact of reasonable pluralism could 
not play the role Rawls wants it to play. Why would we reconcile ourselves 
with an empirical hurdle instead of finding a way around it as best as we 
can? The fact of reasonable pluralism demands more: it forces us to give up 
even the transcendental ideal of a unity of reason,[10] to acknowledge that 
reason (even Reason) is not one.
What I call the Rawls conviction is the commitment to the insight that 
because of the fact of reasonable pluralism we cannot expect truth to resolve 
our reasonable disagreements. We should not mistake this view for relativism 
just yet, because on the one hand, it still maintains that we do get pretty 
far with reason (as proven by Rawls’ own work). On the other hand, we are 
not forced into a relativist or sceptical position, because we can still hold 
on to our convictions as those best justified. The Rawls conviction merely 
demands that we heed the limits of what these justifications permit us to 
think and do with regard to others who are not convinced by them (489).
[11] Yet it does mean that we cannot expect truth to guide us to the one and 
only reasonable political conception of justice, much less to the one and only 
reasonable policy in whatever debate we engage in. The Rawls conviction 
of the irresistible reasonable pluralism thus forces us to realise that truth 
does not resolve political debates. We might even be so bold as to speak of a 
necessary pluralism of truths.
This is not a minority view in political theory, brought about by what is 
often denounced as a ‘postmodern’ contempt for truth. On the contrary, 
the commitment to reasonable pluralism is widespread and limited neither 
to political liberalism nor to poststructuralist political philosophy, radical 
democratic theory or deconstructivism. If we acknowledge the full force of 
the fact of reasonable pluralism, we can see how modern political philosophy 
is in unusual agreement in presupposing a plurality of truths.
II.2 The Arendt Conviction: The Compelling Force of Truth
In her well-known essay Truth and Politics (2006), Hannah Arendt sketches 
the long history of the struggle between politics and truth: Politicians have 
never been regarded as particularly honest whereas “truth-seekers” have 
always been an endangered species (Arendt 2006, 227–230). Her argument 
rests on a series of corresponding oppositions: One the hand, we have politics 
as the realm of plurality, opinions, future-directed actions and lies; on the 
other hand, we have the realm of philosophers and scientists in which truth 
(in singular) plays the decisive role for thinking. Politics is a mode of acting 
with others and necessarily with regarding the opinions of others, and its aim 
is creating and forming a shared reality in which together we can live a life in 
[9] Wenar (1995, 41–48) argues that ac-
cepting the “burdens of judgement” is not 
necessary for being reasonable: According 
to Rawls, being reasonable minimally in-
cludes the willingness to propose and abide 
by fair terms of cooperation, and refraining 
from coercively repressing other compre-
hensive doctrines. Requiring others to 
accept the “burdens of judgement” as the 
reason to do so would define the reasonable 
too narrow, Wenar criticises, because most 
religious doctrines reject the “burdens of 
proof” as they “explain religious diversity 
by stressing the difficulty of finding the 
truth even under the best conditions, while 
universalistic religions present themselves 
as accessible to all clear minds and open 
hearts.” (ibid.)
[10] However, even Rawls’ weakened 
insight into the fact of reasonable plura-
lism in modern societies suffices for my 
argument.
[11] This has of course been disputed: 
see e.g. Raz 1990 and Cohen 2009. I will 
come back to this question in section III.2.
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freedom. Science and philosophy instead are concerned with understanding, 
not acting, and with seeking the truth in singular. Even regarding this truth 
as a mere opinion on equal footing with other opinions is to devalue truth.
Against these background assumptions, Arendt introduces the distinction 
between “rational” and “factual” truth. Examples of rational truths are most 
clearly given by mathematical and scientific truths—the sum of all angles in 
a triangle is 180 degrees; every action causes a reaction of equal force (in a 
closed system). Examples of factual truths are the existence of historical events 
like the fact that the German army invaded Belgium in 1940 (231). Arendt 
argues that the historically older struggle between rational truth and politics 
is mostly over, as rational truths are tolerated (or simply ignored) today.
[12] Now it is the factual truth that is endangered by politics—and it is more 
vulnerable to political action than rational truth because it is contingent. A 
historical fact can be liquidated from our knowledge by erasing all its traces. 
This could happen to a rational truth fact too, but because rational truths are 
necessary truths, they could be discovered again. Hence rational truths do 
not depend on their records as do factual truths (231f.). 
The precarious factual truth is of vital importance to politics, “since facts and 
events—the invariable outcome of men living and acting together—constitute 
the very texture of the political realm” (ibid., see 238). We nonetheless witness 
a battle between factual truth and politics because factual truth has a “despotic 
character” (241) when it comes to politics:
The trouble is that factual truth, like all other truth, per-
emptorily claims to be acknowledged and precludes deba-
te, and debate constitutes the very essence of political life. 
The modes of thought and communication that deal with 
truth, if seen from the political perspective, are necessari-
ly domineering; they don’t take into account other people’s 
opinions, and taking these into account is the hallmark of 
all strictly political thinking. (241)
Just as rational truths set limits for thought, factual truths set limits for 
political debates and actions (238). Herein lies the scandal: Factual truth 
is an external boundary of politics, and the question from a purely political 
standpoint is (for Arendt), whether politics should be limited “by something 
that arises from without, has its source outside the political realm, and is 
as independent of the wishes and desires of the citizens as is the will of the 
worst tyrant” (240).[13]
Yet politics should embrace these non-political boundaries for its own sake, 
Arendt argues, just as reason must know and respect its own limits (as Kant 
argued). Universities, Arendt suggests, could be understood as politically 
established institutions that produce factual truths in order to limit politics 
in the right way. We should think of science and philosophy as a politically 
sponsored limit-setting enterprise; hence the limits their truths establish 
would be politics’ self-limitation via the detour of science and philosophy 
(259–264).
We need not enter into a fuller discussion of Arendt’s complex text, for 
Arendt’s most fundament presupposition is readily apparent: truth—whether 
[12] This might have changed since 1967 
when Arendt wrote her essay. The current 
struggle of conservative politicians against 
the scientific accounts of humanity’s role 
in climate change could be interpreted to 
indicate that rational truth is no longer at 
peace with politics—if it ever was.
[13] Why is factual truth, which is “po-
litical by nature” (Arendt 2006, 238), an 
“external limit” to politics? This is just one 
of Arendt’s many self-contradictions and 
implausible grandiose claims that lead 
Ronald Beiner to sharply (and rightly) 
criticise her “misleading and obfuscating 
account of truth” and her problematical 
view of politics as “addressing (heroically) 
the challenge of human mortality” (Beiner 
2008, 123). For a spirited defense, see 
Zerilli 2005.
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rational or factual—“possess[es] a strength of its own” (259) and “carries 
within itself an element of coercion” (239). Truth is forcefully compelling; 
hence it can be a useful external limit to politics as well as a depoliticizing 
tyrant. It is this fundamental insight into truth’s own force that I will call 
the Arendt conviction: the commitment to the insight that truth is a unique 
force in this world, a compelling and sometimes despotic power that has no 
substitute (259).
As was the case with the Rawls conviction, naming the second conviction 
after Arendt is not meant to imply that it is only Arendt who shares this 
conviction. On the contrary, the idea that truth has a compelling “force” is 
widespread, whether Jürgen Habermas (1984, 24, 28) calls it “the peculiarly 
constraint-free force of the better argument” or Richard Rorty (1997, 22–32) 
opposes ‘Truth’ as a bad philosophical idol of great oppressive power. Arendt’s 
position is especially interesting, however, because she neither defines away 
its coercive potential (as Habermas does) nor rejects truth altogether because 
of its coercive potential (as Rorty [sometimes] does). Instead, she realises that 
it is precisely the ambiguous nature of truth’s compelling force that makes 
it irreplaceable for us.
III. Beyond Post-Truth and Relativism
I have argued that (modern) political philosophy holds two basic convictions 
about the relationship between truth and politics. The Rawls conviction is 
the quite sobering realization that we cannot expect truth to resolve the most 
important political disagreements between reasonable persons. The fact of 
reasonable pluralism forces us to acknowledge the existence of reasonable 
disagreement in political debates and to tolerate different truths answering 
precisely those questions we most deeply care about. Truth in politics is 
plural and weak; we cannot use it to achieve unanimity without exercising 
illegitimate power against disagreeing persons.
The Arendt conviction demonstrates the compelling force of truth. It 
alerts us to the ever-present danger of truth turning into a coercive tyrant, 
because truth tolerates neither contradictory opinions nor being demoted 
to a mere opinion itself. The compelling force of truth makes it problematic 
in the realm of politics, but it is also what makes truth necessary for politics. 
Truth’s compelling force keeps politics’ tendency to alter our shared reality 
in check; hence, we need the compelling force of truth despite the danger of 
its “despotic character” (Arendt 2006, 21).
Both convictions are widely shared, yet clearly conflicting: Whereas the 
Rawls conviction sees truth as anaemic because truth is precisely not strong 
enough to overcome reasonable disagreement, the Arendt conviction sees truth 
as too strong—namely tyrannical—to rely on it without qualifications. The 
former conviction insists on the plurality of truth, the latter on its tyrannical 
and singular nature.[14] Having two basic and intuitively plausible but 
conflicting convictions not only complicates debates in political philosophy, 
it also (partly[15]) explains the attractiveness of the diagnosis that we live in 
a ‘post-truth era’. For it solves the conflict between both convictions, albeit 
[14] As said at the beginning of section II, 
my focus is on the conceptualisation of the 
relationship between truth and politics as 
a conflict between two forces which Rawls 
and Arendt share despite their many diffe-
rences. However, helpfully pressed by an 
anonymous reviewer, let me indicate two 
possible starting points for further inves-
tigations along the concept of “plurality”. 
Both locate the reason for “plurality” in 
the conditions of human life, yet whereas 
Arendt explicitly argues that this does 
not constitute an anthropological thesis 
because human conditions are different 
from human nature (Arendt 1998, 9f.), 
Rawls seems to tie the plurality of opinions 
to our finite bodily nature (see section II.1). 
Yet the decisive difference, I would argue, 
is that Arendt strictly separates action 
and thought (and therefore politics and 
science/philosophy) using the traditional 
distinction between opinions (plural) and 
truth (singular). None of these dichotomies 
are relevant for Rawls who therefore does 
not limit the scope of “plurality” to politics.
[15] Obviously, a full explanation would 
have to take into account basic sociological 
facts about the media as well as the role 
of reputation in the sciences because buzz 
words like ‘post-truth’ are attractive for 
journalists and scientists in order to gain 
valuable attention. As for this text: honi 
soit qui mal y pense.
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in a misguided way: by purely favouring the Arendt conviction (III.1). It thus 
mirrors another misguided attempt to solve the tension purely in favour of 
the Rawls conviction: relativism (III.2). What is needed instead of these 
one-dimensional conceptualisations of the relationship between truth and 
politics is an understanding that combines both convictions (III.3).
III.1 Authoritarianism
We readily recognise that the critical diagnosis of a ‘post-truth era’ embraces 
the Arendt conviction without hesitation. The pluralism of opinions, ‘post-
truth’ critics argue, is feasible only within a carefully guarded territory, the 
limits of which are set precisely by truth. How do we tell mere opinion from 
truth, and who is that ‘we’ authorised to do so? The answer given is ‘science’ 
in singular, defending a singular truth: “[…] the rise of truth as a binding 
force in scientific, legal, political and commercial practices was a gradual and 
hard-won achievement. It is a single currency, furthermore, whose value is 
determined by the extent to which it is defended in each of these interconnected 
spheres.” (D’Ancona 2017, 101)[16] Hence the criticism of our ‘post-truth 
era’ implies that we have to restore and rigorously defend the authority of 
science which, according to this diagnosis, science has lost in recent years 
(e.g. D’Ancona 2017, 41f., 70, 91–96).
Already the claim that science has lost authority would merit more attention 
(see Shapin 2008; Gauchat 2012), yet I will concentrate on the extraordinary 
explanation given by critics of our ‘post-truth era’, namely that ‘postmodernism’ 
is to blame:
For decades, critical social scientists and humanists have 
chipped away at the idea of truth. We’ve deconstructed 
facts, insisted that knowledge is situated and denied the 
existence of objectivity. The bedrock claim of critical phi-
losophy, going back to Kant, is simple: We can never have 
certain knowledge about the world in its entirety. Claiming 
to know the truth is therefore a kind of assertion of pow-
er. […] Call it what you want: relativism, constructivism, 
deconstruction, postmodernism, critique. The idea is the 
same: Truth is not found, but made, and making truth me-
ans exercising power. The reductive version is simpler and 
easier to abuse: Fact is fiction, and anything goes. It’s this 
version of critical social theory that the populist right has 
seized on and that Trump has made into a powerful wea-
pon. (Williams 2017)[17]
The argument is popular but wrong, using two selective inaccuracies: First, 
‘postmodernism’ is turned into a catch-all phrase for theories expounded 
by and developed from the thoughts of authors like “Michel Foucault, Jean-
François Lyotard, Jacques Derrida, Jean Baudrillard and Richard Rorty”, 
to use D’Ancona’s (2017, 91) list.[18] Ignoring the theoretical struggles 
and dissent amongst these very different thinkers, the argument creates a 
homogenous block of “bad guys” —women, e.g. Luce Irigaray or Julia Kristeva, 
to name just two, are never mentioned—whom Bernard Williams (2002, 5) 
calls the “deniers” of truth. Obviously, this is not a neutral descriptive term 
[16] Notice that although D’Ancona adds 
the political, legal and economic system 
to science, science still appears as one 
(uniform) enterprise and includes the 
natural and social sciences as well as the 
humanities.
[17] Variations of the same charge can be 
found in Keyes 2004, chapter 9; Boghossi-
an 2006, 1–9; Frankfurt 2006, chapter 1; 
Hampe 2016; D’Ancona 2017, chapter 4.
[18] Also frequently included are Friedrich 
Nietzsche (in Williams 2017), Edward 
Said and Paul de Man (in Keyes 2004, 
136, 141f.).
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for a group of people supposed to share a certain view about truth but sets 
up a polemic divide. This alone is hardly problematic: a polemic gloss of a 
shared claim between otherwise different authors can be quite illuminating. 
Yet both Williams—Bernard and Casey—interpret what is shared among the 
‘postmodernists’ to be 
a style of thought that extravagantly, challengingly, or—as 
its opponents would say—irresponsibly denies the possibili-
ty of truth altogether, waves its importance aside, or claims 
that all truth is ‘relative’ or suffers from some other such 
disadvantage (4f.). 
This formulation of the shared claim amongst “deniers” paves over their 
different views precisely about the concept, the historicity and the significance 
of truth, thereby ignoring theoretical differences—e.g. between Nietzsche 
(1999), Foucault (1998a) and Lyotard (1988)—important to the argument 
based on the polemic divide.
Let us, for argument’s sake, accept for a moment that it is the somewhat 
less contentious assertion that truth is socially and historically constructed 
and hence connected to power that is shared by ‘postmodernists’. The second 
selective inaccuracy now reduces this shared view and then adds something. 
The claim that truths are socially and historically constructed and that therefore 
truth is connected to power is reduced to equating truth with power. Truth 
suddenly is nothing but the exercise of power. To this reduced version, those 
who blame the ‘postmodernists’ add that therefore, all truths are equal or 
simply that truth is relative. Hence, we can “wave its importance aside” 
(Williams 2002, 4).
Yet the unmodified shared claim that truths are socially and historically 
constructed and therefore connected to power implies of course that truth 
has a compelling force different from power. If it didn’t, what would be the 
point of painstakingly researching all these small steps of its construction? By 
presupposing that any connection between power and truth invalidates truth, 
the critics presuppose a conception of truth which automatically invalidates 
the claim of the ‘postmodernists’. Nothing could be further from the(ir) truth. 
And nothing could be less illuminating of their shared claim—if it exists at all.
In addition to this theoretical objection against blaming ‘post-modernism’ 
for the science’s alleged loss of authority, empirical data (on the USA) suggests 
that “public trust in science has not declined since the 1970s except among 
conservatives and those who frequently attend church” (Gauchat 2012, 182). 
Very few of those worshippers will have been influenced by ‘post-modernism’.
Yet whether or not we find the charge against ‘postmodernism’ plausible, 
the crucial step for critics of our ‘post-truth era’ is to reinstate the authority 
of truth over and above the plurality of mere opinions. Favouring the Arendt 
conviction and discarding the Rawls conviction, they argue that we need 
truth to keep the free play of opinions in check. And the decisive question 
how we tell truth from mere opinion is answered by reference to ‘science’ in 
the singular.
Herein lays the real danger—not because ‘science’ is not a fascinating machine 
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for producing compelling truths but because the sciences are much more diverse, 
contradictory and interesting than the picture of a singular science with its 
history interpreted as a story of progress allows for. Viewing the sciences as 
a homogenous enterprise progressively advancing our knowledge about the 
true nature of things is possible only if we ignore most of the research that 
has been done in the history and philosophy of science in the last century. 
To name just three landmark studies: Thomas Kuhn (1970) shows that the 
natural sciences do not simply expand our knowledge but that their history is 
discontinuous because the sciences undergo revolutionary paradigm changes. 
His path-breaking book inspired historical studies of actual sciences in the 
making instead of a philosophy of science registering textbook results from 
afar. One such study is Bruno Latour’s and Steve Woolgar’s (1986) exploration 
of the Laboratory Life in which they demonstrate how scientific facts are 
literally made, chronicling the hard work to achieve objectivity. Lorraine 
Daston and Peter Galison (2007) have traced the history of this scientific 
ideal—objectivity—, revealing fascinating differences in what scientific objectivity 
meant at different times and how this oriented researchers and their scientific 
work quite differently. None of these studies is beyond debate, but the appeal 
to ‘science’ in the singular and to its linear historical progress forecloses such 
a debate from the start, for only by forcibly denying the complex history of the 
sciences can the critics of our ‘post-truth era’ uphold their clear distinction 
between mere opinions and authoritative scientific truths.
It is precisely at this point that we can see why the diagnosis of a ‘post-
truth era’ entails two authoritarian tendencies as it embraces what Arendt 
(2006, 241) called the “despotic character” of truth without qualifications. 
The critics of a ‘post-truth era’ explicitly argue for reinstating the authority 
of truth which has, according to the Arendt conviction, a despotic character. 
More importantly, they implicitly brush aside all scientific research about 
scientific research in order to justify truth’s authority, thus legitimatizing 
the compelling—despotic—force of truth with an authoritarian dismissal of 
dissenting voices. In their insistence on a fact-based politics that declares that 
‘there is no alternative’, they are disconcertingly similar to those criticised 
for venting ‘alternative facts’. Both seem driven by a wish for order without 
dissent, short-circuiting debate by appeals to authority.
III.2 Relativism
Yet it does not suffice to favour only the Rawls conviction and discard the 
Arendt conviction to void the authoritarianism of the critics of a ‘post-truth 
era’ and of those supposedly establishing it. For an unqualified embrace 
of the Rawls conviction either leads us to a contradictory denial of the fact 
of reasonable pluralism or straightforward into relativism. Rawls himself 
argues that the fact of reasonable pluralism does not demand to give up our 
considered judgements. It does, however, require us to defend our reasonable 
doctrine not as true but as being acceptable to all reasonable persons even 
though they might hold different reasonable doctrines: 
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[Political constructivism] does not use (or deny) the con-
cept of truth; nor does it question that concept, nor could it 
say that the concept of truth and its idea of the reasonable 
are the same. Rather, within itself, the political conception 
does without the concept of truth […]. (Rawls 2005, 94)
Joshua Cohen has lucidly criticised Rawls’ surprising claim. Truth is the norm 
of beliefs, Cohen (2009, 13–15) states, and because even political conceptions 
of justice that avoid commitments to comprehensive doctrines must assert 
some beliefs, doing without the concept of truth (and not just without a 
substantial theory of truth) is impossible. He therefore proposes a political 
conception of truth, a conception ‘thin’ enough to fit within the confines of an 
overlapping consensus in which the plurality of reasonable doctrines meet. 
According to Cohen, conceptions of justice must include a non-metaphysical 
(“political”) account of truth that minimally includes four “commonplaces” 
about truth which Cohen deems relatively uncontroversial: 
(a) Truth is the norm for beliefs, assertions and judgements.
(b) True beliefs represent things as they are.
(c) Truth is more than justification.
(d) Truth is independently important (26f.). 
However, Cohen’s argument that we need not explain those four commonplaces 
in detail and thus that we need no substantial theory of truth to have a political 
conception of truth (28) seems problematic. He claims that deflationary theories 
of truth say “too little” (26) because they cannot explain the value of truth. 
Yet his assertion that truth does have a value independently of justifications 
is hardly more illuminating without giving further details. Thus Cohen either 
falls prey to his own critique or would have to include a substantial theory 
of truth in his account of truth, thus implicating him in the philosophical 
controversies that the political account was designed to circumvent.
Even if we grant Cohen this political conception of truth, admitting the 
existence of an overlapping consensus and thus a meeting point of reasonable 
doctrines despite their pluralism judges the fact of reasonable pluralism to be 
bounded from the start or even reintroduces the unity of reason as a regulative 
ideal.[19] Either way we start to weaken or outright contradict the insight 
into the fact of reasonable pluralism. Thus, the only way left to cope with 
that insight seems to be relativistic in the sense that all truths are equal. If 
we allow for more than one truth regarding the same issue—and nothing else 
would amount to a pluralism of truths—, then denying the equality of these 
truths seems to re-introduce a criterion by which we could judge which of 
these truths is ‘more true’, thereby rejecting our premise of the plurality of 
truths. Hence relativism seems unavoidable as soon as we embrace the Rawls 
conviction wholeheartedly, yet of course we know why that is problematic: 
On the one hand, the position appears to be unstable, as admitting that more 
than one truth about the same issue exists leads us to conclude that no truth 
about the issue exists (if we accept the law of the excluded middle and the law 
of noncontradiction). On the other hand, it seems that resolving reasonable 
disagreements will mostly come about by force. Relativism indeed does not 
appear to be a particularly attractive position.[20]
[19] Obviously, the debate whether Rawls 
(2005) can show the possibility of an over-
lapping consensus between reasonable 
doctrines becomes important here. For 
convincing criticisms see e.g. Wenar 1995, 
38–57 and Talisse 2003, 189.
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III.3 Non-Sovereign Truth in Democratic Politics
If solving the conflict between the Rawls and the Arendt conviction by 
giving up either of them threatens to end in relativism or authoritarianism, 
how are we to think about the relationship between truth and politics? How 
do we defend truth against relativism without succumbing to authoritarianism 
and vice versa?
In order to hold on to both conflicting convictions, we must develop a 
“post-sovereign” (Rouse 1996a), or better yet: non-sovereign, understanding of 
truth. If sovereignty is understood as a standpoint above and beyond political 
struggles, as a standpoint from which the sovereign can rule the struggling 
parties in an impartial manner without being implicated in their conflicts, 
the argument for a non-sovereign understanding of truth starts with the 
realization that there is no such epistemic sovereign standpoint.[21] For 
Joseph Rouse (1996b, 1987) such a non-sovereign understanding of truth and 
knowledge grows out of appreciation of our most advanced social practices 
in which we actually seek truth, namely scientific practices. If we avoid the 
mistakes of presupposing that these practices cohere in an orderly fashion, 
that they have a progressive and linear history and that they can be analysed 
as ‘pure’—untainted by economic, political or other ‘worldly’ affairs—we will 
be able to see how scientific practices really unfold as conflicting, material 
and discursive activities in the world. They partake in political and economic 
struggles and are influenced by them, without their activities being reducible 
to these struggles. Scientific practices, Rouse suggests, must be understood 
as a network held together by conflict and cooperation in which knowledge 
claims are created, passed on, rejected, reproduced etc. Hence
knowledge is not a status that attaches to particular state-
ments, skills, or models in isolation or instantaneously. 
Rather, their epistemic standing depends upon their rela-
tions to many other practices and capabilities, and espe-
cially upon the ways these relations are reproduced, trans-
formed, and extended. Knowledge is temporally diffused or 
deferred: to take something as knowledge is to project its 
being taken up as a resource for various kinds of ongoing 
activity—whether in further research or in various applica-
tions of knowledge (Rouse 1996a, 408).
Knowledge and truth are constituted by “epistemic alignment[s]” (Rouse 1996b, 
185f.) of practices; defending or opposing a certain truth therefore means 
attempting to uphold or to change a specific strategic alignment of scientific 
practices. Yet there is no standpoint beyond these social practices and thus 
beyond the conflicts about truths from which we could safely adjudicate them: 
there is no sovereign epistemic standpoint. Truth is a product of contested 
scientific practices, and there would be no truth without these conflicting 
practices. Moreover, scientific practices are social practices. They do not 
merely involve pure thought but real living actors with their own concerns and 
interests, funding agencies, library resources, computing power, administrative 
complexities and so on. What can become a scientific truth depends on all 
these (and many more) factors which are not external to truth.
[20] See the long-term project of Martin 
Kusch (2017) for an interesting defence 
of relativism.
[21] Donna Haraway (1988, 582) has 
called the illusion to be able to occupy 
such a standpoint the “god trick”.
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In this way, a non-sovereign account of truth makes us understand that 
“truth is a thing of this world” (Foucault 1998b, 131). It makes us understand 
that the compelling force of truth is not an apolitical force and that truth 
therefore does not offer us a standpoint beyond the political and epistemic 
struggles from which we could adjudicate their proper limits. Any attempt to 
do so is itself a political and epistemic move located within these struggles; 
and, if successful, a quite powerful one. Insofar, the plurality of truths (the 
Rawls conviction) is affirmed yet augmented by the insight that truths do 
have a compelling force (the Arendt conviction), so the engagement in the 
struggles between different truths is important. Defending certain truths 
then does not mean to stand outside the practices in which the different 
truths are clashing and to impose limits on these struggles in an authoritarian 
fashion. It means engaging in and defending those social practices in which 
we establish and correct our standards of justification, in which we demand, 
give and scrutinise justifications according to these standards, and in which 
the different sciences are awarded the resources (in terms of freedom and 
generosity, of money and time) they need to support these efforts for making 
and defending truths. A non-sovereign understanding of truth allows (and 
forces) us to fight for the compelling force of truths both epistemically and 
politically, for it recognises the interconnectedness of epistemic and political 
struggles (see Alcoff 1996).
This is not, as some might suspect, just another route to relativism, for 
acknowledging the materiality and historicity of truth does not relativize truth 
or entail that all truths are equal. Quite to the contrary, it presupposes that we 
fight for certain truths and against others because we care for them—and we 
have our reasons why we care for them. Anyone objecting that these reasons 
are not the proper ones—because they are ‘impure’ reasons—reverts back to 
the illusion of a sovereign understanding of truth. Yet neither the sciences 
nor any other practice we know of and engage in can produce this epistemic 
sovereign position.
Of course, the call for these concrete and mundane actions sounds much less 
impressive than the solemn declaration of a new ‘era of post-truth’, as will be 
readily apparent if we briefly return to the three examples with which I started: 
Trump’s inauguration lie, Vote Leave’s broken promise and misleading reports 
about conflicts at universities. How would the ‘non-sovereign’ understanding 
of truth interpret these examples, and what response would it suggest, when 
maintaining both the conviction of a plurality of truths and the conviction of 
their compelling force? First, it draws attention to the struggles in which the 
truth-claims are raised. It thus decodes Trump’s inauguration lie as a call for 
submission and a test of loyalty. The obviously false statement and its many 
siblings work like tiny traps: Those who do not object immediately will have 
more and more trouble the longer they wait to distance themselves from 
Trump because they would have to avow that their repeated submissions 
were shamefully wrong. In order to perform this function, the statements 
must be false, even from the Trumpists’ perspective. Yet defending such false 
statements manifests a truth about its defenders, it provides proof of their 
loyalty. The response therefore should be clear: oppose the lie but, much 
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more importantly, call out its function, support those who do not submit, and 
create possibilities to abandon Trump for those who have a change of heart.
Second, and in addition, a non-sovereign account of truth does not look 
at truth-claims in isolation but analyses the ‘epistemic alignment’ that 
supports them. So the preposterous promise of the Leave campaign must be 
located within the political struggle and the epistemic alignments they form. 
The battery of numbers used by the Remain campaign to scare people was 
certainly important,[22] as was the anti-intellectualism of the Leave campaign 
(D’Ancona 2017, 16–23; for a defence see Fuller 2017, 9–23). Yet perhaps 
more decisive was the neoliberal austerity politics and its “deficit fetishism” 
pursued by almost the entire political class from 1992 to 2015.[23] To cut 
a long story short, Leave’s broken promise was preceded by neoliberalism’s 
broken promises and its silencing of concerned or disagreeing voices. Of 
course, this does not excuse or justify the Leave campaigns NHS-statement, 
let alone its open racism (see Bhambra 2018). Yet we do well to remember that 
statements acquire their epistemic significance against a background of other 
social practices and the standards of justifications upheld or eroded therein. 
Without years of austerity politics insisting that there are no alternatives, 
Leave’s ‘alternative facts’ would never have looked so promising. Again, the 
political and epistemic response to this diagnosis from the perspective of a 
non-sovereign account of truth should be clear: insist that justifications are 
given, demand that sincere objections are met by arguments, not by silence 
or ridicule, and fight those who stifle criticism and dissent.
Third and last, beyond analysing political and epistemic struggles, a non-
sovereign account of truth consciously intervenes in them. This is especially 
important in the third example in which the truth-claims raised are more 
difficult to judge than in the first two examples. Although we certainly will 
not find any left hegemony in German universities, moral arguments for 
silencing others are made, and neither they nor the objections against them 
are obviously false. Recognising the plurality of truths and their compelling 
force, those who hold a non-sovereign account of truth do not presume to 
have a neutral standpoint from which they judge these political and epistemic 
struggles. They are participants in them as soon as they take a stand on these 
matters. And so are reports on the battle over ‘political correctness’. By using 
this label, they frame the issue of individual controversies in a common and 
peculiar fashion. Of course, there is a commonality between these conflicts at 
the universities, and certainly, there is nothing wrong with criticising excessive 
moralism. Yet identifying this pattern with the polemic concept of ‘political 
correctness’ does more than that. It refuses from the start to acknowledge 
that the pattern is simply given by what these fights target: power relations 
known as sexism, racism, classism etc. And it refuses to spell out why the 
moralism in question is worse than these power relations. Hence the response 
from the perspective of a non-sovereign account of truth must be twofold: It 
will fight against framing these struggles according to the preference of the 
right, and it will fight against anyone again erecting a sovereign standpoint 
from which to judge them. Neither god nor morality, neither the state nor 
capital, neither science nor art must lay claim to the compelling force of truth 
[22] “[…] both camps relied heavily on 
fear as a negative economic motivation: 
the Leavers feared losing control over the 
fates of ‘our’ country to ‘Brussels’ (or of 
having to compete with foreign migrant 
labor for jobs), and the Remain camp fe-
ared the adverse economic consequences 
(jobs, trade, investment, exchange rates) 
of Brexit.” (Offe 2017, 18)
[23] For a range of different analyses that 
converge around the same point see Hop-
kin/Rosamond 2017; Koch 2017; Streeck 
2017; Jessop 2016. For a broader over-
view of the political and socio-economic 
background of the Brexit referendum see 
Outhwaite 2018.
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without recognising the plurality of truths.
Defending truth without pretending to be epistemic sovereigns certainly is 
a lot more troublesome than the authoritarian declaration of absolute limits 
or the relativistic shrug. Yet it also is the only chance for a democratic—non-
sovereign—understanding of the relationship between truth and politics.
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